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HOW MANY LIKES DID IT GET? USING 





On September 14, 2015, PolypLab Inc., a company that develops and sells 
coral food and supplements for freshwater aquariums, filed an application for 
the trademark POLYP LAB.1 The mark was applied for in relation to alkalinity 
buffer supplements for live coral for use in aquariums, calcium-based nutrient 
supplements for live coral for use in aquariums, vitamin supplements for coral, 
and amino acids supplements for coral.2 Initially, the mark was rejected be-
cause it was merely descriptive, meaning the trademark attorney concluded 
from the evidence presented that POLYP LAB did nothing more than describe 
the goods or services it was used to sell.3 
After filing a response to the trademark attorney’s rejection, POLYP LAB 
was allowed for publication in the Trademark Official Gazette on June 7, 2016, 
and subsequently registered on the Principal Register on August 23, 2016.4 The 
response focused on highlighting the vast social media presence that PolypLab 
maintains as a brand, from Instagram to Facebook.5 Evidence gathered from 
social media is readily documentable and serves as a real-time record of the 
quantity and quality of interactions between a trademarkable brand and its 
consumers. Evidence presented in the response included comments sections 
                                                 
 * Associate, Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 25, J.D. Candidate, May 2017, 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, B.S. University of Mary-
land, 2013. I would like to thank Megan La Belle for her assistance throughout the research-
ing and writing process, and Maurice Cahn of Cahn & Samuels, LLP for the support and 
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 1 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/755,711 (filed Sept. 14, 2015). 
 2 POLYP LAB, Registration No. 86/755,711. 
 3 USPTO, SERIAL NO. 86/755,711, OFF. ACTION COMM., at 1-2 (Dec. 30, 2015). 
 4 USPTO, SERIAL NO. 86/755,711, OFF. ACTION COMM., at 1 (June 7, 2015). 
 5 USPTO, SERIAL NO. 86/755,711, OFF. ACTION COMM., at 3-4 (Apr. 4, 2016). 
2017] How Many Likes Did It Get?  155 
from Instagram posts,6 Polyp Lab’s Facebook page which features a “Shop” 
section in which users can make purchases directly from the page,7 and photo-
graphs of Polyp Lab booths at various trade shows.8 
Previously employed multi-factor tests used to determine secondary mean-
ing did not consider social media as a contributor to establishing secondary 
meaning for merely descriptive trademarks.9 Such tests, which are outdated and 
need to be reconsidered, favor larger entities with sufficient financial capital to 
invest in advertising and publicity – factors that have traditionally been used to 
measure how well consumers can connect a brand with a particular source. Not 
only does this system put smaller businesses at a disadvantage, but it also fails 
to reflect the shift that social media has caused in terms of how brands market 
their goods and services to consumers. 
Trademarks are words, phrases, symbols, or designs that identify the source 
of goods.10 Well-known examples include MCDONALDS, APPLE, and DIS-
NEY.11 Along with words and phrases, individuals or companies that use cer-
tain colors or sounds in commerce may be able to protect them through trade-
mark law, including the catchy NBC three-chime jingle and Christian 
Louboutin’s famous red shoe soles.12 But not all marks are entitled to legal 
protection. Instead, marks are classified as fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, de-
scriptive, or generic, and only marks within certain classifications are protecta-
ble.13 
Fanciful marks are marks that have no meaning outside of their use as a 
source-identifying device.14 Such marks include EXON, KODAK, and XER-
OX.15 A well-known arbitrary mark is APPLE for computers and phones.16 
Suggestive marks are those that require some “imagination, thought, and per-
ception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”17 SPEEDI-BAKE is a 
                                                 
 6 USPTO, SERIAL NO. 86/755,711, OFF. ACTION COMM., at 3-4 (Apr. 4, 2016). 
 7 Id. at Ex. 10. 
 8 Id. at 6. 
 9 Quoc Viet Foods, Inc., v. VV Foods, LLC, No. SACV 12-02165-CJC, 2016 WL 
3536708, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2016). 
 10 Trademark, Patent or Copyright?, USPTO (June 9, 2016, 1:41 PM), 
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-or-
copyright. 
 11 MCDONALDS, Registration No. 1,352,168; APPLE, Registration No. 4,206,562; 
DISNEY, Registration No. 4,067,997. 
 12 The mark consists of a catchy three-chime jingle. Registration No. 0,916,522. The 
mark consists of famous red shoe soles. Registration No. 3,361,597. 
 13 Daniel A. Tysver, Strength of Trademarks, BITLAW, 
www.bitlaw.com/trademark/degrees.html#arbitrary (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merch. & Mfrs. Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 
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suggestive mark for frozen bread dough, because it takes a step of imagination 
to understand what the mark intends to convey about the product.18 Fanciful, 
arbitrary, and suggestive marks are afforded trademark protection based upon 
their classifications because they are sufficiently distinctive enough to be rec-
ognized without further proof of distinction in the minds of consumers. 
On the opposite end of the distinctiveness spectrum are generic marks. Ge-
neric marks may never receive trademark protection regardless of how con-
sumers perceive the mark in connection with the producer, because a device 
that is deemed generic has been found too important in commerce to limit its 
use exclusively to one manufacturer or service provider.19 For example, ES-
CALATOR was once a trademarked term, but has since become generic be-
cause it gained such wide popularity in commerce that it was too great a bur-
den on free speech to limit its use to a single party.20 
Finally, merely descriptive marks fall in the middle of the generic-fanciful 
distinctiveness continuum. Without more, merely descriptive marks do not 
receive trademark protection because they lack inherent distinctiveness, like 
generic marks, and would create too great a burden on the freedom of speech 
to curtail use of such marks to a single source.21 Examples of merely descrip-
tive marks include COLD AND CREAMY for ice cream.22 
Although federal registration of trademarks is not necessary for enforce-
ment, registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) confers certain benefits on trademarks owners.23 These advantages 
include a legal, rebuttable presumption that the registrant is the owner of the 
mark, constructive notice of the claim of ownership of the mark, the ability to 
stop the importation of infringing or counterfeit goods through recordation of 
the mark with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the right to bring an 
action in federal court for infringement.24 Once a USPTO examining attorney 
determines that the mark is neither generic nor merely descriptive, and falls 
                                                                                                                 
1968)). 
 18 What is a Trademark? NAT’L PARALEGAL, 
http://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/patents/Trademarks1/
What.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). 
 19 Tysver, supra note 14. 
 20 Haughton Elevator v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 80 (1950). 
 21 Tysver, supra note 14. 
 22 Fact Sheet: Introduction to Trademarks, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, 
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkStrengthFactSheet.aspx 
(last updated Aug. 2014). 
 23 U.S. Trademark Registrations: Principal Register v. Supplemental Register, INT’L 
TRADEMARK ASS’N, 
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/PrincipalvsSupplementalRegister.as
px [hereinafter Registrations] (last updated Apr. 2015). 
 24 Id. 
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into the categories of fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive, then the mark is pub-
lished for opposition.25 At this point, qualified third parties may attempt to 
prevent issuance of a mark registration.26 The proceeding takes place before the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), which functions as an administra-
tive tribunal.27 If there are no issues arising from the opposition period, then the 
trademark will issue on the Principal Register. After five years on the Principal 
Register the mark may become incontestable, offering further strength in pro-
tection of the mark to the registrant.28 
When the USPTO determines a source’s trademark is merely descriptive, it 
prohibits the source from having the trademark listed on the Federal Register.29 
A trademark is merely descriptive when it consists of a word or phrase that 
“conveys an immediate idea of the qualities, characteristics, effect, purpose, or 
ingredient of a product or service.”30  The main purposes of denying registra-
tion of merely descriptive marks on the Principal Register are to prevent a 
trademark owner from unnecessarily or unfairly restricting competition by 
limiting the speech of competing brands, and to protect the freedom of speech 
guaranteed to the public through the First Amendment.31 
A merely descriptive trademark may still be listed on the Supplemental Reg-
ister, however.32 Registration on the Supplemental Register affords the trade-
mark registrant some protections, including the use of the ® symbol in com-
merce and the ability to sue on grounds of unfair competition.33 Additionally, a 
trademark registered on the Supplemental Register may be cited by a USPTO 
examining attorney against a later-filed application to register a confusingly 
                                                 
 25 Trademarks - What Happens Next?, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-
getting-started/trademark-basics/trademarks-what-happens-next [hereinafter Trademarks] 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
 26 Tysver, supra note 13. 
 27 Trademarks, supra note 25. 
 28 Registrations, supra note 23. 
 29 The Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012). 
 30 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983), 
abrogated on other grounds by KB Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 
543 U.S. 111 (2004); see also In re SPX Corp., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1592 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (ex-
plaining that examples of merely descriptive trademarks include E-AUTODIAGNOSTICS 
as merely descriptive for an electronic engine analysis system comprised of a hand-held 
computer and related computer software); In re Entenmann’s, Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1750, 
1751 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (explaining that OATNUT as merely descriptive of bread containing 
oats and hazelnuts); In re Andes Candies Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 156 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (explain-
ing that CRÈME DE MENTHE as merely descriptive of a chocolate-covered mint). 
 31 In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 32 Merely descriptive marks may be registrable on the Supplemental Register in applica-
tions under §1 and § 44 of the Trademark Act. See TMEP 1209.01 Distinctive-
ness/Descriptiveness Continuum. 
 33 Registrations, supra note 23. 
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similar mark for related goods or services.34 
In order for a descriptive mark to be listed on the Principal Register, the 
trademark applicant must demonstrate that the trademark has gained secondary 
meaning or acquired distinctiveness, conveying to a consumer that the trade-
mark is indicative of a specific source. 35,36 According to the Trademark Manual 
for Examining Procedures (TMEP), three types of evidence may be used to 
establish acquired distinctiveness under §2(f).37 This Comment will focus on 
the importance of further defining the establishment of acquired distinctiveness 
through use of actual evidence. The forthcoming argument will articulate how 
courts should proceed to construe such evidence in the determination of a find-
ing of secondary meaning for trademarks previously found to be merely de-
scriptive. 
The USPTO refuses registration of marks that are not distinctive and marks 
that are not capable of distinguishing the goods and services of the owner from 
those of others.38 This is because trademarks are arguably the most effective 
commercial tool to capture the consumer’s attention, make the products stand 
out, and provide brands with a competitive advantage.39 The USPTO registers 
trademarks based on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and therefore its 
interest in denying trademarks to applicants who do not show that the marks 
evince a connection between the source and its consumers lies in preventing 
unfair competition, as well as ensuring that the trademark registration system 
promotes a flourishing American industry of interstate commerce.40 Congress 
enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to provide national protection for trademarks 
used in interstate and foreign commerce.41 The burden is on the applicant of a 
trademark deemed merely descriptive or not distinctive by a USPTO examin-
ing attorney to prove that the mark is in fact distinctive.42 
                                                 
 34 Id. 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
 36 For the purposes of this Comment, “secondary meaning” and “acquired distinctive-
ness” will be used interchangeably to mean the transformation which a merely descriptive 
trademark or service mark undergoes “through usage by one producer with reference to his 
product” to acquire “a special significance so that to the consuming public the word has 
come to mean that the product is produced by that particular manufacturer.” 1 HARRY D. 
NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 37 at 66 (2d ed. 1917). 
 37 The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure is a manual published by the 
USPTO for use by trademark attorneys and trademark examiners [hereinafter TMEP]. 
 38 Registrations, supra note 23. 
 39 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, TOP TEN REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT 
TRADEMARKS 6, 16. 
 40 About Us, UPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last updated Aug. 12, 2016). 
 41 Park ‘n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). 
 42 On the question of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), the applicant has the 
burden of proving that its mark has acquired distinctiveness. In re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 
2017] How Many Likes Did It Get?  159 
Based on the above summary of rights afforded to registrants with marks on 
the Principal Register and Supplemental Register, it is obvious why applicants 
would want their marks to be registered on the Principal Register rather that 
the Supplemental Register. 
The USPTO will not allow registration of merely descriptive marks on the 
Principal Register, but will allow registration on the Supplemental Register. 
Once the registrant has demonstrated that the mark has secondary meaning or 
acquired distinctiveness, then the registrant can then file again to have the 
mark registered on the Principal Register.43 When a merely descriptive mark 
acquires secondary meaning or acquires distinctiveness, it “has come through 
use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.”44 The USPTO states in its 
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures (TMEP) that if a trademark or 
service mark is not inherently distinctive, it may be registered on the Principal 
Register only upon proof that it has become distinctive as applied to the appli-
cant’s goods or services in commerce.45  It is the point at which the public 
views the primary significance of a trademark, previously found to be merely 
distinctive, as identifying the source of the product rather than the product 
itself.46 However, once secondary meaning is established as to a particular 
mark, meaning that the consuming public identifies the mark with a specific 
source, the previously merely descriptive mark is afforded protection “under 
the same principles applicable to inherently distinctive marks.”47 
According to the TMEP, three types of evidence may be used to establish 
acquired distinctiveness under §2(f).48 This Comment will focus on the im-
portance of further defining the establishment of acquired distinctiveness by 
actual evidence, and how courts should proceed to construe such evidence in 
the determination of a finding of secondary meaning for trademarks previously 
found to be merely distinctive. 
                                                                                                                 
214 F.2d 139, 140 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (“There is no doubt that Congress intended that the 
burden of proof [under Section 2(f)] should rest upon the applicant”). 
 43 Registrations, supra note 23. 
 44 Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (citing Rest. 3d of 
Unfair Competition § 13 Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990)). 
 45 The Lanham Act, 15 § U.S.C. 1052(f) (2012); TMEP § 1212. 
 46 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (citing Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982)). 
 47 PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558 (2d. Cir. 1990) (citing Rest. 3rd, 
Unfair Competition § 13 cmt. E (Tent. Draft No. 2 (1990)). 
 48 The three types of evidence include prior registrations claiming ownership of a mark 
on the Federal Register that is sufficiently similar to that or those identified in the pending 
application (37 C.F.R. § 2.41(a)(1)(2015), TMEP §§ 1212.04-1212.04(e)), a statement 
certifying the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce for five 
years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made (37 C.F.R. § 
2.41(a)(2)(2015), TMEP §§ 1212.05-1212.05(d)), and other appropriate evidence (37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.41(a)(3)(2015), TMEP §§ 1212.06-1212.06(e)(iv)). 
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This Comment will analyze how federal courts and the TTAB have inter-
preted trademark applicants’ social media presence to establish secondary 
meaning of a mark that has been determined to be merely descriptive by an 
examining trademark attorney. Part II will discuss how courts have historical-
ly responded to applicants’ showings of evidence to establish secondary mean-
ing, noting which types of actual evidence courts found most persuasive, and 
whether these types of evidence are still pertinent to courts’ determinations 
today. It will also discuss current business trends and the shift towards use of 
social media to advertise and promote the source of a product or service in 
commerce. Part III will discuss court and TTAB decisions regarding the value 
of social media as a factor in determining acquired distinctiveness of a merely 
descriptive mark. This section will highlight cases in which social media has 
enhanced an applicant’s claim for establishment of secondary meaning as well 
as cases in which courts have been un-persuaded by the use of social media to 
establish secondary meaning. Part IV will summarize the current state of the 
law with regards to use of social media as a factor to establish secondary 
meaning. Part V argues that social media, specifically customer reviews, is a 
relevant factor for a showing of secondary meaning. Part VI will explain that 
the 2009 Federal Trade Commission regulations for social media create an 
increased similarity between social media advertising and endorsements and 
traditional media, and that courts and the TTAB should view social media as 
analogous to traditional media with regard to evidence of acquired distinctive-
ness. Part VII will argue that courts should be receptive to considering social 
media metrics, including customer reviews, website traffic, and Instagram and 
Facebook use, as evidence of secondary meaning. 
II. EVIDENCE SHOWING SECONDARY MEANING 
The Lanham Act, referred to commonly as the Trademark Act, is the prima-
ry federal trademark statute in the United States.49 The Act codifies require-
ments that must be met by trademark applicants before they are awarded feder-
al trademark registration.50 Such requirements include that the mark is used or 
will be used in commerce; that the trademark applicant has no reason to be-
lieve that the mark belongs to someone else, or that the mark will cause confu-
sion with another existing trademark; and additionally provide a drawing of the 
mark and state what products or services it is used or will be used in connec-
tion with.51 Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act allows an exception to the re-
                                                 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
 50 § 1051(a)(4). 
 51 § 1051(a)(3)(D). 
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fusal of registration on the Principal Register for merely descriptive marks if 
the applicant establishes, to the satisfaction of the examining attorney, that the 
matter in question has acquired distinctiveness as a mark in relation to the 
named goods or services in commerce.52 
An applicant wants to prove secondary meaning for his or her merely de-
scriptive trademark so they can invoke trademark rights granted through regis-
tration on the Principal Register when protecting their mark against trademark 
infringement. Trademark infringement is proved through a “likelihood of con-
fusion” analysis.53 Under the Trademark Act, the owner of a registered trade-
mark may file an infringement claim against anyone who, without permission 
of the owner, uses or imitates the mark in commerce, in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services, where 
such use is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deceive.54 Filing an infringe-
ment suit is one of the benefits that owners of federally registered trademarks 
can enjoy, so the applicant has a huge interest in gaining federal registration 
through proving acquired distinctiveness. 
A trademark applicant who has received a final rejection from an examining 
attorney to obtain trademark protection through the Principal Register based on 
a finding of no secondary meaning may appeal to the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board. An applicant who is dissatisfied with the outcome of an appeal 
to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board may then appeal to the Federal Cir-
cuit.55 An alternative route also available is filing a civil action in any appropri-
ate district court.56 Various separate procedural routes, as well as discrepancies 
among circuits regarding the value afforded to different examples of evidence 
proving secondary meaning, have led to the appellate process being an unpre-
dictable and expensive ordeal. 
An applicant carries the burden of proof when asserting that her merely de-
scriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning.57 The determination of ac-
quired distinctiveness is a question of fact, evidence of which must be con-
tained in the record.58 
Because the level of descriptiveness of a trademark is a continuum rather 
                                                 
 52 § 1052(f). Section 2(f), unlike the other five provision of §1052, is not a provision 
under which registration on the Principal Register should be refused; rather it is a provision 
under which applicant has a chance to prove that he is entitled to a federal trademark regis-
tration which would otherwise be refused. Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 
F.2d 1572, 1580 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Capital Formation Counselors, Inc., 
219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 916, 917 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1983)). 
 53 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)-(b). 
 54 Id. 
 55 TMEP §1705.09. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Yamaha, 840 F.2d at 1578-79. 
 58 In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 769 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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than a discrete category, the level of descriptiveness in relation to the mark for 
which the applicant seeks to establish secondary meaning affects the amount 
and type of evidence required to establish secondary meaning.59 For example, 
where an applicant’s mark contains words or phrases commonly used by third 
parties in her field or closely related fields, the mark is highly descriptive and 
would thus require a greater showing of evidence to establish secondary mean-
ing.60 A prominent example of a highly descriptive mark was found in the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruling that THE BEST BEER IN 
AMERICA, while still descriptive and not generic, was incapable of acquiring 
sufficient evidence of secondary meaning to restrict the use of the laudatory 
phrase to one source.61 
The Fifth Circuit, for example, weighs the following factors to determine 
whether secondary meaning has been acquired depending heavily on the case 
at hand, and the determination is “primarily an empirical inquiry.”62 The factors 
set forth in Pebble Beach include 
(1) length and manner of use of the mark or trade dress, (2) volume of sales, (3) 
amount and manner of advertising, (4) nature of use of the mark or trade dress in 
newspapers and magazines, (5) consumer-survey evidence, (6) direct consumer 
testimony, and (7) defendant’s intent in copying the trade dress or mark.63 
The Pebble Beach factors have been relied on multiple times.64 Among 
them, evidence demonstrating an establishment of secondary meaning in the 
form of consumer surveys has been found most persuasive.65 According to the 
International Trademark Association, 40 participants is the size of the typical 
“pilot” survey used to assess secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion in 
trademark oppositions and litigation.66 
                                                 
 59 TMEP § 1209.01; see also Remington Products, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 
F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(explaining that the mark must be viewed in the context of 
its use). 
 60 See, e.g., In re Packaging Specialists, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 917, 918 (T.T.A.B. 
1984). 
 61 Anderson Duff, Boston has the best beer, but does it have the best trademarks?, 
BOSTON.COM (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://archive.boston.com/business/blogs/global-
business-hub/2012/11/boston_has_the.html. 
 62 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 63 Id. 
 64 The Pebble Beach factors have been cited by the AIPLA Federal Circuit Legal Stand-
ards as the factors required by the 5th Circuit to establish secondary meaning. LEGAL 
STANDARDS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS – 2011 UPDATE 5th Cir. (AIPLA TRADEMARK 
LITIG. COMMITTEE 2011). 
 65 Amazing Spaces Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 248 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 (“The authorities are in agreement that survey evidence is the 
most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning.”); see also Aloe Crème 
Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 66 Paul F. Kilmer, The Value Equation of Trademark Oppositions: A Multinational 
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“Under Trademark Rule 2.41(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. 2.41(a)(3), an applicant may 
submit affidavits, declarations under 37 C.F.R. 2.20, depositions, or other ap-
propriate evidence showing the duration, extent, and nature of the applicant’s 
use of a mark in commerce that may lawfully be regulated by the U.S. Con-
gress, advertising expenditures in connection with such use, letters, or state-
ments from the trade and/or public, or other appropriate evidence tending to 
show that the mark distinguishes the goods or services.”67 
As the Internet revolution began to take hold of the way businesses devel-
oped and widened the pool of potential start-up business owners, so too did it 
change the way these new business developers interacted with their existing 
and potential clients. Through social media, businesses are able to carve out 
their own space in online commerce with minimal up-front investment.68 
From the entrepreneur’s viewpoint in promoting its brand, product, or ser-
vice on social media, many factors contribute to the growing popularity of this 
channel of communication with the relevant consumers. First, the costs associ-
ated with social media marketing and maintaining a social media campaign are 
highly discretionary in terms of the amount of resources the business is able or 
willing to dedicate to its maintenance.69 As opposed to traditional avenues of 
marketing such as television, radio, and print, social media is relatively inex-
pensive and can be implemented or terminated at the user’s will, often without 
start-up fees or fear of breach of contract issues.70 
Additionally, costs associated with television, radio, and print advertising 
vary greatly based on many factors, including the time slot and duration that 
the advertisement will run, the channels it will reach, and its distribution.71 The 
resources that a trademark applicant has to expend in advertisements are con-
sidered a determining factor in establishing secondary meaning.72 However, 
when there is such a great fluctuation among costs associated with different 
types of traditional advertising that courts accept as proof of secondary mean-
ing, it may be worthwhile to question how accurate it is to look at the amount 
                                                                                                                 
Comparison of Costs and Perceived Benefits, INTABULLETIN (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TheValueEquationofTrademarkOppositionsAMult
inationalComparisonofCostsandPerceivedBenefits.aspx. 
 67 TMEP § 1212.06. 
 68 Pure Imagination, Inc. v. Pure Imagination Studios, Inc., No. 03-C-6070, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. WL 2967446, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2004). 
 69 Gabriel Reynaga, Traditional vs. Digital Advertising, GABRIEL REYNAGA (July 27, 
2015), http://www.gabrielreynaga.com/traditional-vs-digital-advertising/. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 “Look for Advertising” A Key to Establishing Distinctiveness For Registration Pur-
poses, FITZPATRICK CELLA, 
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/documents/Fitz_eNewsv2_2.4_TM.p
df (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
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spent on advertising, and examine instead how the advertising works to reach 
consumers.73 
Secondly, unlike television, print, and radio advertisement, social media 
campaigns enable businesses to evaluate how well their campaign is working 
and to what degree viewers or participants are engaged in the content that a 
company is producing through its social media channels.74 Social media plat-
forms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allow account owners to see 
how much interaction has occurred between the public and the uploaded con-
tent.75 When account owners can use metrics to track how the public and their 
relevant consumer base receive their social media, there is more assurance that 
their followers are making a connection between the content produced by the 
accounts (including trademarks) and who the account owners are (the source). 
Popular metrics that account owners can use to track their social media con-
tent include tracking trademark or brand mentions, the frequency at which a 
company’s content is shared by the public or the company’s account followers, 
traffic referred from third-party websites or other Internet sources to a compa-
ny’s website or social media page, and the number of engaged community 
members as measured by comments, direct messages, and other measureable 
actions.76 These metrics provide an idea of whether a company is effectively 
reaching its existing and potential clients through social media. They also pro-
vide more feedback than the traditional avenues of advertisement in which a 
brand or company will expend resources on advertising and send it out into the 
ether without a direct and concrete way to determine how it is received or how 
the relevant consuming public relates to it.77 
From the consumer side, potential customers use social media to connect 
                                                 
 73 For example, advertisements in Super Bowl 50 broadcast cost $5 million for a 30-
second spot. While 114.4 million people tuned into the Super Bowl in 2015, it would require 
an inference or assumption that those viewers would be considered relevant consumers with 
regard to any or all of the advertisements aired during the Super Bowl. Claire Groden, This 
is how much a 2016 Super Bowl ad costs, FORTUNE (Aug. 6, 2015, 1:08 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/06/super-bowl-ad-cost/. 
 74 Brad Shorr, 10 Dumb Social Media Mistakes That Small Business Owners Make, 
FORBES (Jan. 21, 2016, 10:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/01/21/10-
dumb-social-media-mistakes-that-small-business-owners-make/#65659fea42b1. 
 75 Facebook, FACEBOOK, facebook.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) (social networking 
site which allows users to connect with others by sharing content such as photos, text posts, 
videos, and news headlines); Twitter, TWITTER, twitter.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) 
(social networking site which limits users’ posts and interactions to 140 characters); Insta-
gram, INSTAGRAM, Instagram.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) (social networking site which 
allows users to upload photos and videos to their own accounts, while users can interact 
with other users by “liking” and commenting on post by others). 
 76 Shorr, supra note 74. 
 77 Id. 
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with brands and companies, ask questions, leave product or service reviews, 
and learn about products and services.78 A study performed by the digital mar-
keting firm G/O Digital found that before visiting a small business, 30% of the 
people polled check that business’s Facebook page “several times a day.” 79 
This is no surprise due to the accessibility that users have to social media and 
the increased use of social media channels through mobile devices.80 The ac-
cessibility that consumers have to businesses when they have an interest in a 
product or service they provide allows consumers to make a mental connection 
between the source (represented by the business’s Facebook page, for exam-
ple) and the product or service they are seeking out. 
A significant percentage of former traditional media consumers have 
stopped reading, watching, or listening to news sources because they no longer 
fulfill the reasons for which they seek out and access the media.81 In early 
2013, for example, about one-third of former readers had deserted a particular 
news outlet.82 To stay connected and have access to the same content, they turn 
to social media. 
Based on the above, unsurprisingly, there has been a tangible commercial 
shift in the business world with respect to traditional advertising channels and 
digital advertising. Every type of traditional advertising is declining while 
digital advertising is steadily increasing.83 Though courts are reluctant to apply 
long-established standards for secondary meaning to the use of social media 
and digital advertising, the shift in how businesses interact with consumers to 
build a link between their trademark and their business as a source must be 
recognized as a factor alongside expenditures in advertising and market sur-
veys. 
Since businesses started to depend on websites to establish secondary mean-
ing of merely descriptive trademarks, courts have determined which types of 
evidence from a business’s online presence are suitable to prove acquired dis-
tinctiveness. In re Sones is a Federal Circuit case which lays out the elements 
necessary for specimen acquired from a website to be probative evidence in a 
showing of trademark use.84 The test requires that the specimen “must in some 
                                                 
 78 Justin Lafferty, Study: Before people shop at a small business, they check Facebook, 
ADWEEK (Aug. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://adweek.com/socialtimes/study-before-people-
shop-at-a-small-business-they-check-facebook/300. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Greg Sterling, State of the News Media: Everything in Decline But Digital, MARKET-
ING LAND (Mar. 18, 2013, 1:43 PM), www.marketingland.com/library/channel/social-
media-marketing. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Kristine Lu & Jesse Holcomb, Digital News Revenue: Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. 
(June 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/digital-news-revenue-fact-sheet. 
 84 In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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way evince that the mark is ‘associated’ with the goods and serves as an indi-
cator of source.”85 Just as courts were hesitant to begin a shift towards accept-
ing screenshots from websites and webpages as evidence to show trademark 
use, there is resistance to the acceptance of social media use in establishing 
secondary meaning.86 However, as the trend moves more towards businesses 
depending on social media to make their products known to their consumer 
base, courts need to establish a test for applicants to rely on in order to make 
the appeal process more predictable. 
III. RECENT CASES REGARDING SOCIAL MEDIA AS A FACTOR 
ESTABLISHING ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS 
Cases in Which Courts Have Found Acquired Distinctivness Based on Social 
Media 
Several recent cases have required courts to make a determination regarding 
which elements are necessary for evidence of consumers’ use of social media 
to be probative of secondary meaning for a trademark. 
In Blumenthal Distributing v. Executive Chair, Inc., Blumenthal Distrib-
uting, a chair distribution company, sought a finding of secondary meaning for 
chairs that it marketed for sale on its own website as well as on websites of 
third-party retail customers.87  Blumenthal did not submit evidence of advertis-
ing expenditures, which is a traditionally accepted type of evidence for estab-
lishing secondary meaning.88 Instead, Blumenthal submitted evidence of the 
chair being displayed on its website as well as its retailers’ websites.89  The 
court held that this “undoubtedly contributed to the public’s association of 
those chairs with a single source.”90 
In addition, Blumenthal submitted evidence in the form of unsolicited posi-
tive product reviews from customers.91 The court held that these positive re-
                                                 
 85 Id. at 1288. 
 86 Lyons v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary Sports Med. & Rehab., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 92, 
105 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding the plaintiff veterinarian failed to establish trademark in-
fringement since the plaintiff’s mark failed to establish distinctiveness from secondary 
meaning based on factors including advertising through social media). 
 87 Blumenthal Distrib. v. Exec. Chair, Inc., No. CV-10-1280 (CBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 142193, at *6-7, (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010). 
 88 Id. at *24. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (citing Cartier, Inc., v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
226, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (crediting both direct advertising and “co-op” advertising in 
which costs were shared between Cartier and its dealers)). 
 91 Blumenthal Distrib., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142193, at *24-25. 
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views indicated that Blumenthal’s chairs had “developed a presence and favor-
able reputation on the internet and weigh[ed] in favor of a finding of secondary 
meaning.”92 While not dispositive in showing acquired distinctiveness, the 
court in Blumenthal readily acknowledged that customer reviews should hold 
at least some value in helping an applicant prove that consumers of a product 
associate a specific mark with a specific source. 
In GamerModz v. Golubev, the plaintiff GamerModz is a Florida-based cor-
poration that owns the service mark GAMERMODZ, and sells modified video 
game controllers online with the domain name “Gamermodz.com.”93 Gam-
erModz sued Mikahil Golubev for his use of “GamingModz” and “Rapid-
Modz” in connection with modified video game controllers after GamerModz 
began receiving Golubev’s products that were being returned by customers of 
GamingModz and RapidModz.94 In response, Golubev filed a counterclaim 
asserting that GAMERMODZ is merely descriptive and lacking secondary 
meaning, and therefore it is not a protectable mark capable of being infringed.95 
While GamerModz did not include evidence based on market survey or direct 
consumer testimony, there was a finding of secondary meaning on the basis of 
advertising expenditures amounting to $100,000 in Google AdWords search 
engine optimization, an online advertising service.96 
Advertising expenditure is historically a factor considered by courts in the 
acquired distinctiveness analysis.97 The cost paid for GoogleAds advertising in 
this case was a factor that was relevant to establishing secondary meaning. 
GamerModz provided additional evidence that the advertising created through 
investing in Google AdWords brought over 250,000 consumers to the appli-
cant’s website.98 This direct link between dollars spent and effect on consumer 
exposure to applicant’s mark is likely more persuasive than a dollar amount 
standing alone, because it demonstrates that the online advertising expenses 
creates a nexus between the producer and the consumer. However, it can be 
argued that the evidence is not dispositive of consumer awareness that the 
mark is representative of the applicant source.99 
                                                 
 92 Id. at *25. 
 93 GamerModz, LLC v. Golubev, No. 8:10–CV–1466–T–27TGW, 2011 WL 4755026, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 94 Id. at *1, *7-8. 
 95 Id. at *1-2, *28-29. 
 96 Id. at *34; see also What is Google AdWords? How the AdWords Auction Works, 
WORDSTREAM, http://www.wordstream.com/articles/what-is-google-adwords (“Google 
AdWords is an advertising program.  provided by Google that enables businesses to bid on 
certain keywords in order for their clickable ads to appear in Google’s search results.”). 
 97 GamerModz, 2011 WL 4755026, at *12. 
 98 Id. at *13. 
 99 See Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“While evidence of a manufacturer’s sales, advertising and promotional activity may be 
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Cases in Which Courts Have Refused to Find Acquired Distinctivness Based 
on Social Media 
A number of recent cases have held that trademark owners have failed to es-
tablish acquired distinctiveness despite a social media presence.  In Nortech 
Investments Ltd., the TTAB refused to recognize the applicant’s mark CASI-
NO INFO as having acquired secondary meaning.100 The plaintiff sought to 
register CASINO INFO in connection with a website providing information on 
gaming and entertainment.101 Nortech Investments stated in its application that 
its continued use for 13 years of the website “CasinoInfo.com” should serve as 
evidence that CASINO INFO had acquired distinctiveness.102 
The TTAB evaluated the applicant’s evidence, which included the number 
of visitors to its website over several months’ time.103 Specifically, the evidence 
showed that between January and September of 2012, CasinoInfo.com re-
ceived traffic from 17,615 visitors, and in 2011 received traffic from 28,570 
unique visitors.104 Nevertheless, the TTAB determined that this evidence was 
insufficient to prove secondary meaning. 
The TTAB found the evidence insufficient on the basis that there was “noth-
ing in the record to put [the number of visitors to the website] in context...to 
indicate applicant’s market share or the proportion of relevant consumers ex-
posed to applicant’s mark.”105 Additionally, the Board found it insufficient that 
there was only evidence submitted regarding traffic to the website by visitors 
for the time period of January 2011 through September 2012.106 Though the 
evidence showed that the applicant’s site was receiving traffic and consumers 
were interacting with it on at least a basic level, the TTAB was hesitant to 
recognize this evidence as probative of a showing of acquired distinctiveness 
because there was no way to tie in the traffic with how consumers felt about 
CASINO INFO with respect to the applicant and applicant’s website.107 
Another case in which the link was missing between consumers’ awareness 
of a mark in connection with a source can be found in Pure Imagination, Inc. 
                                                                                                                 
relevant in determining secondary meaning, the true test of secondary meaning is the effec-
tiveness of this effort to create it.”). 
 100 In re Nortech Inv. Ltd., 2013 WL 5407237, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
 101 Id. at *8. 
 102 Id. at *7. 
 103 Id. at *8. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (explaining the TTAB could not tell from the record “whether 28,570 hits on its 
website in a year represents anything more than some passing interest in the content of 
applicant’s website, as opposed to wide recognition of the words CASINO INFO as an 
indication of source.”). 
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v. Pure Imagination Studios, Inc.108 Pure Imagination was a small advertising 
and marketing firm incorporated in Illinois.109 Pure Imagination Studios (“Stu-
dios”) provided advertising, graphic design, illustration, and web site services, 
and was also incorporated in Illinois.110  The dispute between the parties was 
over rights to the trademark PURE IMAGINATION.111 Studios acquired rights 
to the domain name www.PureImagination.com in May 2001 and argued that 
acquisition of the domain name served as evidence that Studios was using the 
mark as a trademark. Without more, however, “mere registration of a domain 
name does not constitute the use of the domain name as a trademark.”112 
In Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., an appli-
cant for a mark submitted evidence attempting to demonstrate trademark use 
through the purchase of a domain name.113 The Eastern District of Virginia 
court determined that purchasing a domain name did not show trademark use, 
because although “[a]nyone may register any unused domain name upon pay-
ment of a fee,”114 but there is missing probative evidence showing that consum-
ers associate the domain name (which happens to be the sought-after trade-
mark) with the source. 
A showing of domain name registration as evidence of secondary meaning, 
without more, is a logical basis upon which to reject a showing of secondary 
meaning, because domain name registration does not require the registrant to 
do more than pay a fee.115 There could easily be no interaction between the 
website and the public after the time of registration, and such registration can-
not count as evidence towards establishing secondary meaning.116 
In another TTAB decision, In re King Productions, Inc., the Board deter-
mined that the applicant had not established secondary meaning after submit-
ting as evidence the sale of 884 copies of the ROCK YOUR BODY DVD for 
which applicant was seeking trademark protection.117 An employee of the ap-
plicant company testified that all sales were transacted through the applicant’s 
website, pages of which contained the applied-for mark in connection with the 
                                                 
 108 Pure Imagination, Inc. v. Pure Imagination Studios, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1432, 1436-
37 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 109 Id. at 1433. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1435 (citing Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 
691 (N.D. III. 1997)). 
 113 Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D. 
Va. 1999). 
 114 Id. at 491 n.3. 
 115 Burns v. Realnetworks, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (“The 
first party to adopt and use a mark in commerce obtains ownership rights in the mark.”) 
(citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)). 
 116 Burns, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. 
 117 In re King Prods., Inc., 2014 WL 7172033, at *10-11 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
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sold DVD, as well as a book, apparel, choreography and dance workshops and 
special event production services.118 
Because the applicant in this case was proving secondary meaning to show 
that the mark was representative of a source, rather than a single work, the 
applicant had a higher burden of proof.119 The TTAB found the evidence of 
sales originating from and transacted through rockyourbody.com to be insuffi-
cient for a showing of secondary meaning on the basis that there was not “sig-
nificant exposure” of the ROCK YOUR BODY mark displayed such that a 
significant portion of the consuming public would be aware of it.120 
Without more, such as evidence showing that the consumers knew that 
ROCK YOUR BODY was representative of the applicant source, rather than 
only being the name of the DVD, the TTAB refused to allow registration of the 
mark.121 Had the applicant submitted evidence of consumers demonstrating an 
understanding of the link between the mark and the source, perhaps through 
reviews of the applicant’s products, there may have been a greater chance of 
the TTAB finding that the applicant had established secondary meaning. 
An example of a TTAB appeal in which the applicant presented direct testi-
mony but still did not reach the level of evidence necessary to establish ac-
quired distinctiveness is demonstrated in In re FreeHailEstimate.com.122 In this 
case, Freehailestimate.com applied for a stylized mark featuring FREE-
HAILESTIMATE.COM.123 After final rejection and appeal to the TTAB, the 
applicant submitted evidence from its social media pages including Face-
book.124 In addition to evidence from social media, the applicant submitted “21 
form declarations from possible customers and business professionals in the 
paintless dent repair industry” affirming that they knew of Freehailesti-
mate.com through its unique advertising and business model.125 
The TTAB decided that evidence in the form of 21 form declarations pro-
vided by applicant was insufficient to prove secondary meaning.126 The majori-
ty of the declarations were from technicians or independent contractors with 
whom the applicant may have worked.127 The Board found that of the submit-
ted declarations, only three were from end users who could potentially associ-
                                                 
 118 Id. at *9-10. 
 119 Id. at *8 (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F. 3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 120 King Prods., 2014 WL 7172033 at *10. 
 121 4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.73 (4th 
ed. & Supp. 2015). 
 122 In re FreeHailEstimate.com, 2012 WL 6654117, at *16 (T.T.A.B. 2012). 
 123 Id. at *1 n. 1. 
 124 Id. at *17. 
 125 Id. at *14. 
 126 Id. at *19. 
 127 Id. at *16. 
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ate FREEHAILESTIMATE.COM with the applicant.128 This evidence, accord-
ing to the Board, “does not demonstrate that the relevant purchasers in general 
recognize FREEHAILESTIMATE.COM as a mark” and is therefore not suffi-
cient to prove secondary meaning.129 
Additionally, the applicant presented evidence that its website and Facebook 
page had established a “substantial and continuous presence in electronic me-
dia”130 in the form of 159 Facebook “likes.” The Board found persuasive the 
examining attorney’s observations that there was no way to know how many of 
those “likes” were provided by people employed by or related to the applicant, 
rather than members of the relevant consumer public, and above all, the num-
ber was not large enough in context to establish secondary meaning.131 
Some courts have offered commentary as to which evidence applicants 
should have gathered and submitted in order to increase their likelihood of 
proving secondary meaning. For example, in Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. 
Foundation for Apologetic Information & Research, the court stated “the num-
ber of search engine hits, standing alone, is inadequate to demonstrate that 
consumers associate the mark with a particular product or producer, or per-
ceive UTAH LIGHTHOUSE as a distinctive mark.”132 
The court then cited to a similar unsuccessful example in which Vail Ski 
Resort relied on as evidence for secondary meaning the fact that “Ski Maga-
zine had repeatedly ranked the Vail Ski Resort as a preeminent ski resort over 
the last twenty years.”133 The Utah Court explained the evidence of “Vail” in a 
ski resort ranking publication “would have been more probative of consumer 
perceptions” if there was, in addition, evidence of the percentage of consumers 
who read the magazine or evidence as to the circulation of the magazine.134 
With regard to search engine hits, the Court stated that evidence accompanying 
the number of hits, such as proof that the “relevant market of consumers” had 
visited the websites containing these hits, would have been more useful to 
establishing secondary meaning for the applicant.135 
Similarly to Utah Lighthouse, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in 
Nortech did not find metrics of website traffic sufficient to prove secondary 
                                                 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at *16-17. 
 131 Id. at *17 (citing In re Country Music Ass’n, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1824, 1834 (T.T.A.B. 
2011)). 
 132 Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. For Apologetic Info. & Res., 527 F.3d 1045, 
1051 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 133 In re FreeHailEstimate.com, 2012 WL 6654117, at *17 (citing Vail Assocs. v. Vend-
Tel-Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 853, 867 n.12 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
 134 Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1051 (citing Vail Assocs., 516 F.3d at 867 n.12). 
 135 Id. 
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meaning.136 There is a missing factor in establishing proof of secondary mean-
ing by relying on raw metrics alone, which is the connection that consumers 
create between the content on a website and the source of the website; this link 
is not something that can be proved by website traffic and raw metrics alone. 
IV. CURRENT OUTLOOK 
Currently, the TTAB prefers not to delineate a bright-line rule with regards 
to the evidence necessary to establish secondary meaning, and instead cites to a 
standard emphasizing the success that an applicant has in educating the public 
to associate the proposed mark with a single source.137 Though not necessary, 
the Board considers survey evidence to be a valuable method of showing sec-
ondary meaning.138 When relying on survey evidence, the TMEP emphasizes 
the fact that the evidence should demonstrate that the “consuming public views 
the proposed mark as an indication of the source of the product or service,” and 
moreover that the consumer associates the mark with one single source, not 
one of many sources.139 
Many circuit courts have attempted to simplify the required showing of evi-
dence to establish secondary meaning by providing applicants with a list of 
types of evidence that can be probative in establishing acquired distinctive-
ness.140 In determining secondary meaning, courts often consider factors in-
cluding plaintiff’s advertising expenditures, consumer surveys, sales success, 
unsolicited media coverage, attempts to plagiarize the trademark, and length of 
exclusivity of use of plaintiff’s trademark.141 
While a bright-line test should simplify the appeal procedurally, it has in-
stead created divisiveness between circuits as some courts weigh certain fac-
tors more heavily than others.142 For example, the 7th Circuit weighs product 
success heavily in establishing secondary meaning.143 The neighboring 8th Cir-
                                                 
 136 Nortech, 2013 WL 5407237, at * 8. 
 137 TMEP § 1212.06. 
 138 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2001) (cit-
ing I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 42 (1st Cir. 1998)); Perini Corp. v. 
Perini Const., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Thompson Medical Co. v. 
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2nd Cir. 1985)). 
 139 TMEP § 1212.06(d) (2016). 
 140 L & J.G Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture, 79 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 141 Id. at 259. 
 142 Kenneth L. Port, Note, Eighth Circuit Trademark Opinions, 36 WILLIAM MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1657, 1659-60 (2010). 
 143 See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 
(7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that secondary meaning is established when consumers think of 
the word as the product itself instead of being merely a descriptive tool). 
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cuit, however, has stated that evidence of the success of a product cannot pro-
vide the basis for an inference of secondary meaning because something other 
than secondary meaning could be the cause of the success of the product.144 
This discrepancy, though not relevant in every case, can cause issues for 
trademark applicants,145 especially because the Trademark Act is a federal stat-
ute. Thus, there should be a greater effort put forth for circuit courts to apply a 
unified bright-line rule so that divisiveness does not cause unpredictable results 
between circuits. 
A common factor in many circuits whose test for secondary meaning out-
lines a list of probative evidence is the high value placed on consumer studies 
reflecting how the consumer views the trademark in relation to the source of 
the good it identifies.146 The American Intellectual Property Law Association 
Trademark Litigation Committee released standards of the federal circuit 
courts in 2011, among which most of the courts identified consumer surveys as 
a probative type of evidence used to establish secondary meaning.147 
Courts have been hesitant to consider an applicant’s website traffic metrics 
as evidence of secondary meaning.148 It is clear that, although metrics that rec-
ord website traffic provide concrete information to applicants and domain 
name managers, the hard numbers are missing the link between consumers and 
the source that allows for a showing of secondary evidence – that is, the link 
that connects the product and its source in the minds of consumers.149 When 
courts consider a website to be “a potential promotional tool,” as it was con-
sidered to be in Lyons, if there is no evidence showing that consumers become 
aware of the source’s mark through that site, then “the mere existence of a 
website is not highly probative of either an effective advertising technique or… 
the public’s association” of the mark with the source.150 
                                                 
 144 See, e.g., Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enter., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 676, 689 (E.D. Wis. 
1997). 
 145 See generally Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Lanham Act: Time for a 
Face Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1013 (2002). 
 146 See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 160 (4th Cir. 2012); For-
tune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 
2010); Zatarains, 986 F.2d at 795; see also Foamation, 970 F. Supp. at 687 (emphasizing 
that secondary meaning stems from consumers’ ability to identify the source of the product 
rather than the product itself). 
 147 LEGAL STANDARDS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS – 2011 UPDATE 5th Cir. (AIPLA 
TRADEMARK LITIG. COMMITTEE 2011). 
 148 Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1051 (holding that Utah Lighthouse failed to establish a 
secondary meaning); Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 
1035, 1036, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that “Blinded Veterans Association” is 
generic and thus unprotectable). 
 149 Jenzabar, Inc. v. Long Bow Group, Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct., 648, 665-66 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2012); Chatam Int’l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp 2d. 549, 556-57 (E.D. Pa. 2001); 
Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 793-94. 
 150 Lyons, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
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V. PARTIES CAN USE SOCIAL MEDIA TO ESTABLISH THEIR MARKS, 
BUT MUST BE AWARE OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
Based on the existing case law and TTAB decisions, courts and the TTAB 
appear to be hesitant to allow trademark protection when there is evidence of 
social media presence, but only weak evidence that the consumers of the 
trademark applicant’s products or services associate the mark with the goods or 
services. 
Though social media is an increasingly popular method by which brand 
owners foster relationships and communicate with their customers, this trend 
has not yet been reflected through adoption of social media metrics as a form 
of evidence establishing acquired distinctiveness. In the cases that have been 
discussed in this Comment, trademark applicants who had success with using 
social media to prove a showing of secondary meaning among consumers ac-
complished such a task through evidence of a high enough quantum of con-
sumer interaction with the applicant’s interactive platforms.151 This is helpful 
for larger companies who already have a sizeable market share, or brands that 
have large market audiences for their area of commerce. 
Courts already use a two-part threshold determination before reaching the 
factors that are probative of secondary meaning. First, they define the goods 
and services that the mark identifies, and then they specify the relevant con-
suming public.152 If courts extrapolated this threshold determination to apply to 
cases involving evidence of social media, then the size of the company would 
not prevent the source from submitting evidence of social media interactions 
simply because they appear to be objectively lower. Because a mark achieves 
secondary meaning only when a “significant quantity of the consuming public 
understand the name as referring exclusively to the appropriate party,” it is an 
essential task to determine what the size of the consuming public is.153 If courts 
took into account the size of the market in which the applicant is competing, 
then applicants could be more confident in relying on evidence of website 
visits or other quantifiable online communication without being concerned 
about having to measure up to the social media presence of larger businesses. 
However, it does not help those smaller businesses that are relying on social 
media to connect to users and make a first impression for their business, a 
practice utilized by many small companies.  Given that over 80% of small 
                                                 
 151 See, e.g., GamerModz, 2011 WL 4755026, at *12-15 (in which 250,000 website hits 
established acquired distinctiveness in trademark). 
 152 Lyons, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04 (citing Boston Beer Co., Ltd. v. Slesar Bros. Brew-
ing Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 153 Boston Beer, 9 F.3d at 181 (emphasis added). 
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businesses rely on social media to promote their brand,154 and that these small 
businesses are less likely to shell out large amounts of money on advertising 
campaigns, the use of social media in establishing acquired distinctiveness for 
trademarks would benefit those who rely on it most heavily if the quantum of 
interactions were considered in light of the business’s target audience.155 
Precedent has shown, however, that trademark applicants do not need a 
staggeringly high level of platform traffic in order to gain trademark protection 
or defend their registered trademark. Customer reviews have been given evi-
dentiary significance in proving acquired distinctiveness, comparable to con-
sumer surveys that have historically been considered as evidence supporting 
secondary meaning.156 This appears to be the most effective way to use social 
media to prove secondary meaning, as it shows the nexus that must exist be-
tween the source and the consumer. 
An issue that could arise when relying on customer reviews would be courts 
and the TTAB taking into consideration the identity of the affiant or declarant 
when making a determination about the value of the affidavits or declarations 
as evidence of acquired distinctiveness.157 The veil of anonymity afforded to 
social media users could work to the detriment of trademark applicants who 
want to rely on customer reviews, which may function as quasi-affidavits or 
declarations, as these statements as evidence could be weakened by an inability 
to state the identity of the affiant or declarant. 
Along with the risk of insufficient credibility given to a customer review, 
customer reviews from individuals, typically who have a personal interest in 
the success of the trademark or brand, will be discredited by both the courts 
and the TTAB.158 For those managing social media accounts for brand devel-
opment purposes, a major key to ensuring that the content of the accounts will 
be helpful in demonstrating secondary meaning among customers is by curat-
ing the account, assuring that the information provided by brand owner and the 
customers communicating with it is both authentic and unbiased.159 The Word 
                                                 
 154 Geoff Weiss, This is How Small Businesses Are Using Social Media, ENTREPRENEUR 
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 156 Box Acquisitions, LLC v. Box Packaging Products, LLC, 32 F. Supp. 3d 927, 936 
(2014). 
 157 In re Doctors on Liens, Inc., 2015 WL 7273015, at *7 (T.T.A.B. 2015). 
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 159 Melissa Landau Steinman & Mikhia Hawkins, When Marketing Through Social 
Media, Legal Risks Can Go Viral 2-3, VENABLE (May 2010), 
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of Mouth Marketing Association, which advises businesses on best practices in 
digital, social, and mobile marketing, suggests that brand managers make nec-
essary disclosures when third parties endorse their products or services. This is 
recommended to maintain integrity in the social media campaign and addition-
ally to avoid reliance on customer reviews that courts or the TTAB will use to 
discount and discredit trademark prosecution or litigation as being too involved 
in the success of the company to be given the same evidentiary weight as 
would be given a traditional consumer survey.160 
VI. FTC REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA PROMOTES CONSISTENCY 
WITH EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL ADVERTISING 
In 2009 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) introduced revisions to its 
Testimonial and Endorsement Guides.161 Under the revised FTC Act, “native 
advertising,” or advertising that is paid media where the ad experience follows 
the natural form and function of the user experience in the platform in which it 
is placed, can amount to a false advertising violation.162 The first case in which 
this issue was discussed was when Lord & Taylor paid the online fashion mag-
azine Nylon and 50 Instagram users, each with “a massive number of follow-
ers” to write reviews for a specific article of clothing.163 Lord & Taylor did not 
require any of the paid advertisers to disclose that they were reviewing the 
product in exchange for compensation, a fact that the FTC believed was mate-
rial to consumers’ understanding of the relationship between the company and 
the endorsers.164 
 The Endorsement Guidelines are available to advertisers to advise them 
on how to keep their endorsement and testimonial ads in line with the FTC 
Act.165 The standards treat advertising and marketing via social media just as 




 160 Word of Mouth Marketing Association Guide to Best Practices for Transparency and 
Disclosure in Digital, Social, & Mobile Marketing, WOMMA, http://www.womma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/WOMMA-Social-Media-Disclosure-Guidelines-2013.pdf (last 
updated Nov. 18, 2013). 
 161 Press Release, FTC, FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimo-
nials, (Oct. 5, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter FTC Press Release]. 
 162 Lesley Fair, FTC’s Lord & Taylor Case: In Native Advertising, Clear Disclosure is 
Always in Style, FTC (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2016/03/ftcs-lord-taylor-case-native-advertising-clear-disclosure. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 FTC Press Release, supra note 161. 
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they do similar practices employed in the context of traditional media.166,167 The 
FTC protocol provides recommendations to the people who use social media to 
write about products and services, whether as a voluntary review or after being 
compensated by the brand for their endorsement. 168 
The FTC Act does not apply differently to online reviewers than to tradi-
tional print publications; and, online reviewers found to be in violation of the 
FTC Act can be subject to forfeit of profits gained from deceptive advertising. 
169 By publishing a comprehensive set of suggestions to online reviewers and 
social media account managers for products and services, the FTC acknowl-
edged the influence and import that such reviews have on commerce and estab-
lishing a certain image with a specific source. 170 
The goal of the FTC Act is to ensure that “the audience understands the re-
viewer’s relationship to the company whose products are being recommend-
ed.”171 Not only does an undisclosed endorsement put brand owners at risk of 
violating the FTC Act, but it could also count against them in an attempt to 
establish acquired distinctiveness of a merely descriptive trademark.172 For 
these reasons, social media account managers and product reviewers should 
understand that borderline-commercial interactions such as product reviews are 
governed in the same way that traditional commercial activity is governed. As 
such, courts and the TTAB should view authentic, disclosed endorsements 
with the same evidentiary value as traditional forms of advertising. 
In addition to customer reviews, other commercial activity occurring on so-
cial media should be considered under the traditional analysis for acquired 
distinctiveness for merely descriptive trademarks. For example, Instagram 
enables certain account owners to include a link button in their posts which 
upon clicking redirects visitors to the account owner’s website where visitors 
can purchase goods and services online.173 Often this link button is labeled 
“Buy” and serves to “transform viewers into shoppers with a single click.”174 
Banana Republic was the first to employ these new marketing tools on the 
                                                 
 166 Steinman & Hawkins, supra note 159. 
 167 Traditional media here includes trade shows, conferences, educational seminars, 
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social media platform in March of 2015 and the developments have increased 
in popularity since their debut.175 
Facebook has similarly added a shopping option to its “Pages” feature.176 A 
Page on Facebook is owned and managed by a business or organization, and 
recently Facebook added a Shop application to the Pages options, allowing 
visitors to a business or organization’s Page to see what products or services 
are available to purchaser from the business or organization and initiate the 
commercial transaction.177 Facebook has also recently developed a Messenger 
app that allows businesses to communicate with customers about placing or-
ders and answer questions about the business’s products and services.178 
Facebook and Instagram have motives to provide more commercially inter-
active platforms for customers and businesses or organizations to communicate 
– bringing in advertising money. However, by changing the way that business-
es choose to advertise and generally communicate with their audiences, these 
social media giants are causing tension in the way that courts and the TTAB 
historically analyzes evidence showing acquired distinctiveness. If the trend is 
going to continue in the direction of social media platforms becoming increas-
ingly capable of hosting complex commercial transactions, then the bodies 
determining what factors are important in establishing secondary meaning 
must recognize this trend and the powerful effect it has already started to have 
on businesses. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
According to the International Trademark Association, in a study comparing 
the average costs for trademark oppositions among countries, the United States 
averages between $150,000 and $500,000, while other countries’ average costs 
are considerably lower.179 The survey attributes the cost disparity to the proce-
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dural requirements of the TTAB, including discovery requests.180 
To avoid some of the costs of adjudicating a claim for acquired distinctive-
ness, the USPTO should consider social media use and online presence as 
actual evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Because examining attorneys do 
not and should not specify the kind or amount of evidence sufficient to estab-
lish that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, applicants would benefit from a 
more inclusive definition of what the USPTO will consider persuasive evi-
dence in establishing acquired distinctiveness. 
Allowing such evidence would help increase efficiency within the system 
when appeals to the TTAB regarding an examining attorney’s refusal to find 
evidence sufficient for establishing secondary meaning are a common and 
prohibitively costly occurrence. Especially because social media is based upon 
metrics and tracking who sees what information, the courts should have less 
trouble than with surveys or advertising through newspaper and other tradi-
tional media outlets in establishing whether social media has effectively led 
consumers to an understanding that the applicant’s mark has come to represent 
a source rather than a product. 
The difficulty in prescribing a method of best use for social media in estab-
lishing acquired distinctiveness for merely descriptive marks evolves from the 
highly fact-dependent assessment of each individual trademark registration, 
rejection, or contestation. Regardless of the facts of each matter, business own-
ers should feel that it is in their best interest to invest in managing social media 
platforms for their brands in order to connect with customers. 
Businesses should also do so with the assurance that they can rely on the 
records kept by social media accounts to prove that they are entitled to the 
brand goodwill that they have put effort into fostering. It is time for the TTAB 
and courts to acknowledge the shift in how businesses communicate with their 
audiences and revise a long-standing formulation for determining acquired 
distinctiveness of merely descriptive trademarks in a way that fits in with the 
modern business trend promoted by social media. 
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